

# Contents

**About the Author — V**

**Annotation — VII**

**Introduction — IX**

- 1 Electromagnetic pulse—a parcel from the past — 1**
  - 1.1 Introduction — 1
  - 1.2 History of HEMP — 1
  - 1.3 The issues of theoretical physics — 9
  - 1.4 People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) as the primary “designer” of the first Soviet nuclear explosive — 12
  - 1.5 Thermonuclear bombs — 29
  - 1.6 Nuclear test explosions — 36
  - 1.7 The status of HEMP protection — 53
  - Bibliography — 59
  
- 2 A contemporary view of HEMP for electrical engineers — 60**
  - 2.1 Is the contemporary view up to date? — 60
  - 2.2 The basic physical processes — 60
  - Bibliography — 77
  
- 3 HEMP simulators — 79**
  - 3.1 HEMP simulators: principle of operation — 79
  - 3.2 Classification of HEMP simulators — 81
  - 3.3 Foreign HEMP simulators — 82
  - 3.4 HEMP simulators available in Russia and Ukraine — 88
  - 3.5 Portable HEMP simulators — 93
  
- 4 The vulnerability of electronic equipment to HEMP — 95**
  - 4.1 Electronic equipment is the most important component of the modern infrastructure — 95
  - 4.2 The vulnerability of discrete electronic components to HEMP — 96
  - 4.3 Vulnerability of integral circuits (microchips) to HEMP — 99
  - 4.4 Vulnerability of microprocessors to HEMP — 104
  - 4.5 Vulnerability of computers to HEMP — 107
  - 4.6 Conclusions — 108
  - Bibliography — 109

- 5 Electronic components for HEMP protection system — 110**
  - 5.1 Testing of low-power protective components under the low pulse voltages — **110**
  - 5.2 Testing of low-power protective components under the high pulse voltages — **114**
  - 5.3 Testing of powerful protective components under conditions close to reality — **118**
  - 5.4 Conclusions — **125**  
Bibliography — **126**
  
- 6 External protection of power systems' electronic equipment from HEMP — 128**
  - 6.1 Introduction — **128**
  - 6.2 Analysis of capability of conventional building materials to weaken electromagnetic emission — **128**
  - 6.3 Composite construction materials with improved electrical conductivity — **132**
  - 6.4 Materials absorbing electromagnetic emission — **138**
  - 6.5 Another method for depression of HEMP electromagnetic field strength inside the power industry facilities containing the electronics — **142**
  - 6.6 Reducing electronic equipment vulnerability to HEMP with architectural solutions — **145**
  - 6.7 Conclusions — **146**  
Bibliography — **146**
  
- 7 The issues of electronic equipment grounding at the power facilities — 149**
  - 7.1 Types of electromagnetic interference at power facilities — **149**
  - 7.2 Challenges of the conventional grounding systems — **150**
  - 7.3 Differences between lightning and HEMP — **154**
  - 7.4 Grounding of electrical equipment as the main protective means for HEMP — **160**
  - 7.5 Protection devices for HEMP — **161**
  - 7.6 New method for grounding electronic equipment mounted inside the cabinets — **162**  
Bibliography — **169**
  
- 8 The issue of control cables selection for HEMP-protected electric facilities — 171**
  - 8.1 Introduction — **171**
  - 8.2 Designs and features of shielded control cables — **171**
  - 8.3 Evaluation of control-cable shielding effectiveness — **175**
  - 8.4 Choosing control cables — **177**

- 8.5 Conclusion — 178
- Bibliography — 178
  
- 9 Grounding of control-cable shields — 179**
  - 9.1 Introduction — 179
  - 9.2 Shielding principles — 179
  - 9.3 Interference types and grounding options for cable shields — 180
  - 9.4 Problems and contradictions — 181
  - 9.5 Factors impacting the effectiveness of shield groundings — 182
  - 9.6 The suggested method of shield grounding — 185
  - Bibliography — 187
  
- 10 HEMP filters — 189**
  - 10.1 Introduction — 189
  - 10.2 Do the filters really protect from an electromagnetic pulse? — 189
  - 10.3 The frequency range of filters — 193
  - 10.4 Feasibility of HEMP equipment protection with filters — 193
  - 10.5 Protection of equipment from HEMP high-frequency noise — 195
  - 10.6 Protection of the equipment from the HEMP-generated pulse overvoltage — 196
  - 10.7 Ferrite filters — 197
  - 10.8 Conclusions — 210
  - Bibliography — 211
  
- 11 High-voltage insulation interfaces — 212**
  - 11.1 Introduction — 212
  - 11.2 High-voltage link for transmitting discrete commands in relay protection, automation and control systems — 212
  - 11.3 Usage reed-switch-based high-voltage interfaces in HEMP susceptibility tests — 218
  - 11.4 Design features of high-voltage isolation interfaces — 219
  - Bibliography — 221
  
- 12 Improvement of the resilience of industrial cabinet-installed electronic equipment to HEMP Impact — 222**
  - 12.1 Introduction — 222
  - 12.2 New cabinets for electronic equipment — 222
  - 12.3 Retrofitting existing cabinets equipped with glass doors — 225
  - 12.4 Enhancement of the cabinet cable entries — 228
  - 12.5 Voltage pulse suppression — 233
  - 12.6 Retrofitting grounding systems of electric cabinets — 236
  - 12.7 Conclusion — 237

Bibliography — 237

- 13 Basic principles of direct-current auxiliary-power system (DCAPS) protection — 238**
  - 13.1 Introduction — 238
  - 13.2 Protection of DCAPS operating equipment from HEMP — 238
  - 13.3 Backup-power supplies for DCAPS systems — 240
  - 13.4 Mobile substations and features to protect their DCAPS from HEMP — 245
  - 13.5 Direct-current auxiliary-power systems of power plants — 251  
Bibliography — 252
  
- 14 Protection of telecommunication systems in electric power facilities from HEMP — 253**
  - 14.1 Introduction — 253
  - 14.2 Ways to solve the problem — 254
  - 14.3 The use of fiber-optic communication lines — 254
  - 14.4 Protection telecommunication equipment with galvanic couplings — 255
  - 14.5 New devices for protecting existing telecommunication equipment — 260
  - 14.6 Protection of the communication cabinets — 263
  - 14.7 The general concept for communication-equipment protection — 265
  - 14.8 Retrofitting grounding systems of cabinets containing the electronic equipment — 266
  - 14.9 Retrofitting open-patch panels — 267
  - 14.10 Protection of the power supply system — 267
  - 14.11 Retrofitting the facility (room) containing the critical kinds of communication equipment — 267
  - 14.12 Conclusion — 268  
Bibliography — 268
  
- 15 Improvement of HEMP resilience of automatic fire-suppression systems — 269**
  - 15.1 Introduction — 269
  - 15.2 Firefighting systems for power facilities — 269
  - 15.3 Improvement of automatic firefighting system's resilience to HEMP — 273
  - 15.4 Conclusion — 278  
Bibliography — 278
  
- 16 Protection of diesel generators from HEMP — 279**

- 16.1 Introduction — 279
- 16.2 Increasing resilience of medium- and high-capacity DGs — 279
- 16.3 Protection of DGs stored and de-energized outdoors — 280
- 16.4 Protection of DGs connected to consumer network — 284
- 16.5 Active protection method for diesel-generator controller — 288
- 16.6 Conclusion — 295
- Bibliography — 295
  
- 17 Features of HEMP resilience-test methods for power system electronics — 296**
  - 17.1 Introduction — 296
  - 17.2 Features of testing equipment on a HEMP simulator — 296
  - 17.3 Test objectives — 297
  - 17.4 Features of the test procedure — 298
  - 17.5 Test modes and test-pulse parameters — 300
  - 17.6 Performance criteria — 302
  - 17.7 Conclusion — 303
  - Bibliography — 304
  
- 18 Methods and means of evaluation of the effectiveness of HEMP protection of the installed power-system — 305**
  - 18.1 Introduction — 305
  - 18.2 Testing of equipment resilience to direct impact of the HEMP electrical field (E1-component) — 305
  - 18.3 Equipment for HEMP filter testing — 307
  - 18.4 Equipment designed for evaluation of the effectiveness of building, room and cabinet shielding — 311
  - 18.5 Pulse voltage generators — 313
  - 18.6 Conclusion — 315
  - Bibliography — 315
  
- 19 Features of testing digital protective relays resilience to HEMP — 317**
  - 19.1 Use of performance criterion during the electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) test of electronic equipment — 317
  - 19.2 Features of using performance criterion during the HEMP resilience test of digital protective relays (DPR) — 317
  - 19.3 Criticism of the DPR testing method used — 318
  - 19.4 Analysis of the result of the second independent trial of the same type of DPR — 320
  - 19.5 Analysis of the result of the third independent trial of the same type of DPR — 323
  - 19.6 Conclusions — 331

Bibliography — 332

**20 Establishment of inventory of electronic equipment's replacement modules as a way to improve survivability of the power system — 334**

- 20.1 Optimization of inventory of electronic equipment replacement modules — 334
- 20.2 The problem of the traditional mode of SPTA storage — 335
- 20.3 Requirements for protective containers — 336
- 20.4 Protective containers available on the market — 337
- 20.5 Conclusion — 340  
Bibliography — 341

**21 The problem of impact of geomagnetically induced currents on power transformers and its solution — 342**

- 21.1 Geomagnetically induced currents generated by solar storms — 342
- 21.2 Geomagnetically induced currents generated by HEMP — 352
- 21.3 The effect of the E3 component of HEMP on electric power equipment — 353
- 21.4 Protection of power equipment from geomagnetically induced currents — 354
- 21.5 Conclusions — 362  
Bibliography — 363

**A Standards on HEMP — 365**

- A.1 Standards of International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) — 365
- A.2 Standards of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) — 366
- A.3 Standards of European Commission — 366
- A.4 Standards of International Telecommunication Union (ITU) — 366
- A.5 Military Standards (USA) — 366
- A.6 NATO Standards — 367

**B EMP and its Impact on Power System (List of Reports) — 369**

- B.1 EMP Theory — 369
- B.2 Geomagnetically Induced Currents and its Impact on Power System — 369
- B.3 EMP Impact on Power System — 370

**C European Projects related to Protection against HEMP — 375**

**Index — 377**